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BRIEF AMICI CURIAE OF
FEMINIST ANTI-CENSORSHIP
TASKFORCE, ET AL., IN AMERICAN
BOOKSELLERS ASSOCIATION v.
HUDNUT
Nan D. Hunter* and Sylvia A. Law**
The document that follows represents both a legal brief and a
political statement. It was written for two purposes: to mobilize,
in a highly visible way, a broad spectrum of feminist opposition
to the enactment of laws expanding state suppression of sexually
explicit material; and to place before the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit a cogent legal argument for the constitutional invalidity of an Indianapolis municipal ordinance that
would have permitted private civil suits to ban such material,
purportedly to protect women. 1 Drafting this brief was one of
• Director, American Civil Liberties Union Projects on Lesbian and Gay Rights, and
on AIDS and Civil Liberties. B.A., Northwestern University, 1971; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1975.
•• Director, Arthur Garfield Hays Civil Liberties Program and Professor of Law, New
York University School of Law. B.A., Antioch College, 1964; J.D., New York University
School of Law, 1968. MacArthur Prize Fellow.
1. The ordinance states:
Pornography shall mean the sexually explicit subordination of women, graphically depicted, whether in pictures or in words, that also includes one or more of
the following:
(1) Women are presented as sexual objects who enjoy pain or humiliation; or
(2) Women are presented as sexual objects who experience sexual pleasure in
being raped; or
(3) Women are presented as sexual objects tied up or cut up or mutilated or
bruised or physically hurt, or as dismembered or truncated or fragmented
or severed into body parts; or
(4) Women are presented being penetrated by objects or animals; or
(5) Women are presented in scenarios of degredation [sic], injury, abasement,
torture, shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a context
that makes these conditions sexual; [or]
(6) Women are presented as sexual objects for domination, conquest, violation,
exploitation, possession, or use, or through postures or positions of servility
or submission or display.
INDIANAPOLIS, IND., CODE § 16-3(q) (1984).
The Court of Appeals held that the Indianapolis ordinance violated the first amendment, and the Supreme Court affirmed that ruling without issuing an opinion. American
Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). It
appears that the Feminist Anti-Censorship Taskforce (FACT) analysis had some influence on Judge Easterbrook's approach to the constitutional issues presented. The opin-

69

70

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 21:1 & 2

the most demanding and exhilarating assignments either author
has yet undertaken.
The brief was written on behalf of the Feminist Anti-Censorship Taskforce (FACT) and was co-signed by the Women's Legal Defense Fund (WLDF) and eighty individual feminists. The
analysis of sexuality underlying the brief flows directly from a
long tradition of nineteenth-century women's rights activists
who sought sexual self-determination as an essential aspect of
full liberation. From the beginning, others within the early feminist movement opposed this understanding of feminism because
they viewed sexuality as a realm in which women often suffered.
To protect women, they sought to restrict male sexual freedom
by imposing on men the standard of sexual purity already applied to women. 2
The modern feminist movement has continued this divergence
of viewpoint. Simone de Beauvoir, for example, saw the erotic as
an aspect of human liberty and insisted that sexual self-determination constitutes a fundamental part of women's liberation. 3
Since 1966, women's demands have included calls for greater
sexual freedom for women and an end to double standards.' At
the same time, the movement has fought for and won a number
of reforms to curb rape and other violence directed pointedly at
women. 11 A part of the feminist antiviolence movement evolved
first into a campaign aimed at depictions of violence against
women in a variety of media and then into a campaign aimed at
all pornographic imagery, whether violent or not. 6
ion discusses concrete examples illustrating the difficulty of distinguishing images that
liberate women from those that subordinate women. Id. at 330. It addresses the relationship between images, ideas, and behavior, and the distinction between fantasy and reality, in terms that are unusually rich and thoughtful for a judicial opinion. Id. The court
rightly rejects the state's claim that pornography is "low value" speech, entitled to lesser
constitutional protection than "serious" talk about public issues. Id. at 331.
2. DuBois & Gordon, Seeking Ecstasy on the Battlefield: Danger and Pleasure in
Nineteenth-Century Feminist Sexual Thought, in PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING
FEMALE SEXUALITY 31 (C. Vance ed. 1984) [hereinafter PLEASURE AND DANGER).
3. S. DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX 202-03, 366-413 (H. Parshley trans., 5th printing
1968).
4. See Hunter, The Pornography Debate in Context: A Chronology of Sexuality,
Media & Violence Issues in Feminism, in CAUGHT LOOKING: FEMINISM, PORNOGRAPHY &
CENSORSHIP 26 (1986) [hereinafter CAUGHT LOOKING); Snitow, Stansell & Thompson, Introduction, in PowERS OF DESIRE: THE POLITICS OF SEXUALITY 9 (A. Snitow, C. Stansell &
S. Thompson eds. 1983) [hereinafter POWERS OF DESIRE).
5. See S. SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES OF
THE BATTERED WOMEN'S MOVEMENT (1982).
6. See Snitow, Retrenchment Versus Transformation: The Politics of the Antipornography Movement, in CAUGHT LOOKING, supra note 4, at 10, and in WOMEN
AGAINST CENSORSHIP 107 (V. Burstyn ed. 1985).
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Meanwhile, as feminist discourse on issues of sexuality became more elaborate, conservative forces also mobilized around
issues of sexual imagery. An alliance of traditional moralists, the
New Right, and some feminists promoted and defended the Indianapolis ordinance. 7 In the current political environment, the
conservative voices are plainly more powerful than those of the
feminists. For conservatives, the current interest in suppression
of pornography forms part of a larger agenda to reverse recent
feminist gains through a moral ·crusade against abortion, lesbian
and gay rights, contraceptive education and services, and
women's fragile economic achievements. Conservatives and religious fundamentalists oppose pornography because it appears to
depict and approve of sex outside marriage and procreation. The
Right seeks to use legitimate f~inist concern about sexual violence and oppression to reinstate traditional sexual arrangements and the formerly inexorable link between reproduction
and sexuality.
In 1985, conservative efforts to focus attention on suppression
of sexual imagery culminated in Attorney General William
French Smith's establishment of a Commission on Pornography
charged to find "more effective ways in which the spread of pornography could be contained."8 Because most Americans do not
share the moral view that confines sex to a solely procreative
role, the Commission's mission was to modernize the assault on
sexually explicit images by demonstrating that pornography
causes violence. Despite the number of members chosen with a
history of vehement opposition to sexually explicit material9 and
7. Duggan, Censorship in the Name of Feminism, Village Voice, Oct. 16, 1984, at 11,
col. I. The ordinance was introduced in the Indianapolis City Council by a member
whose career was founded on anti-ERA organizing. Id. at 12, col. I. The central popular
support for its passage came from fundamentalists who attended the meetings at which
the Council voted on the ordinance. The Reverend Greg Dixon of the Indianapolis Baptist Temple, a former Moral Majority official, organized the fundamentalist presence. Id.
at 16, col. 1.
8. 2 ATIORNEY GENERAL'S COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., FINAL REPORT app. A, at 1957 (1986) [hereinafter COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY].
9. The Commission was chaired by Henry Hudson, a prosecutor whom President
Reagan praised for closing down every adult bookstore in Arlington, Va. At least six of
the 11 Commission members had previously taken strong public stands opposing pornography and supporting obscenity laws as a means of control. B. LYNN, POLLUTING THE
CENSORSHIP DEBATE: A SUMMARY AND CRITIQUE OF THE FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY 14-16 (1986) (ACLU Public Policy Report);
Vance, The Meese Commission on the Road, NATION, Aug. 2, 1986, at 76 (also listing
Commission member Frederick Schauer as having taken a public stand opposing pornography). For example, Commission member Dr. James Dobson is President of Focus on
the Family, an organization that is "dedicated to the preservation of the home and the
family and the traditional values growing out of the Judeo-Christian ethic." B. LYNN,
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tight control of the witness list, 10 the Commission was unable to
"prove" that pornography causes violence.
Social scientists, whose work the antipornography movement
had previously utilized, refused in their testimony to draw the
simple connections between pornography and violence that the
Commission sought. 11 Like FACT, these researchers urged the
use of caution in the extension of artificial laboratory findings to
naturalistic settings. Further, they testified that aggressive imagery and the mainstream media present more worrisome concerns than sexual imagery and X-rated channels. 12 Unable to
marshal systemic evidence that pornography causes concrete injury, the Commission was forced to rely upon the anecdotal testimony of carefully selected and well-prepared individual victims13 and to invoke a vastly broadened concept of "harm."14
Perhaps the most significant and most telling aspect of the
Commission's work was its inability to agree on a definition of
pornography. 111 Undaunted, the Commission concluded that
most commercially available pornography is "degrading" and
contains "characteristics of degradation, domination, subordination, and humiliation," particularly of women. 16 An earlier draft
supra, at 15. In addition, Commission member Frederick Schauer had previously argued
for a highly restricted application of the first amendment. Id. at 17; Schauer, Speech and
"Speech"-Obscenity and "Obscenity": An Exercise in the Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEO. L.J. 899, 922-23 (1979).
The three people without prior established positions on pornography frequently resisted the staff's agenda. They endorsed a statement that said that while they abhorred
"the exploitation of vulnerable people" in pornography, they also rejected "judgmental
and condescending efforts to speak on women's behalf as though they were helpless,
mindless children." 1 CoMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 194 (statement of Dr.
Judith Becker, Ellen Levine, and Deanne Tilton-Durfee). Two of these three women dissented from the final report. See id. at 195-212 (statement of Dr. Judith Becker and
Ellen Levine).
10. Over three-fourths of the witnesses urged tighter controls over sexually explicit
materials. B. LYNN, supra note 9, at 7.
11. See generally id. at 57-88. Prof. Edward Donnerstein has denounced as "bizarre"
the Commission's effort to use his research to buttress a claim that sexually violent material causes criminal behavior. Goleman, Researchers Dispute Pornography Report on
Its Use of Data, N.Y. Times, May 17, 1986, at Al, col. 1.
12. Vance, supra note 9, at 79.
13. See 1 CoMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 322-49. With respect to materials regarded by the Commission as nonviolent but degrading, the Commission acknowledged that there was little concrete evidence "causally linking the material with sexual
aggression" but nonetheless concluded that the "absence of evidence should by no means
be taken to deny the existence of the causal link." Id. at 332.
14. "[T]he most important harms must be seen in moral terms, and the action of
moral condemnation of that which is immoral is not merely important but essential." Id.
at 303~
15. Id. at 227-32.
16. See id. at 331.
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of the Commission report had even offered examples of such material.17 For the final report, however, the Commission also
found itself unable to agree on examples of "degradation."1 8
The Meese Commission recommended new federal and state
legislation and increased prosecution to suppress sexually explicit materials to the maximum extent constitutionally possible.19 Unfortunately, it failed to embrace the recommendation of
the 1970 Commission on Obscenity and Pornography20 to commence a serious sex education effort to empower young people to
develop a healthy and balanced view of sexuality that would enable them to avoid unwanted pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases. The Meese Commission did not recommend
strengthening federal law to prohibit sexual harassment in the
workplace. 21 It did not call for legislation to remove spousal immunity in sexual assault cases or for funding to improve law enforcement against domestic violence.
At the level of popular opinion, little support seems to exist
for either conservative or feminist campaigns against sexual imagery. Press reaction to the Meese Commission report was uniformly negative. 22 In 1985, voters in Cambridge, Massachusetts,
17. B. LYNN, supra note 9, at 71-72. These examples included:
[Djepictions of a woman lying on the ground while two standing men ejaculate
on her; two women engaged in sexual activity with each other while a man looks
on and masturbates; a woman non-physically coerced into engaging in sexual
ac~ivity with a male authority figure, such as a boss, teacher, or priest, and then
begs for more; . . . a woman with legs spread wide open holding her labia open
with her fingers; a man shaving the hair from the pubic area of a woman; a
woman dressed in a dog costume being penetrated from the rear by a man . . . .
Id. at 71-72.
18. Id. at 72.
19. Two Commission members, both women, filed a sharp and cogent dissent. 1
CoMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 195-212 (statement of Dr. Judith Becker and
Ellen Levine).
20. COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY & PORNOGRAPHY, THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY (1970).
21. For a case illustrating an inadequacy of the present antidiscrimination law, see
Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 622 (1986) (holding that posters of nude
women on workplace walls and supervisors' obscene comments do not constitute actionable sexual harassment).
22. P. NOBILE & E. NADLER, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs. SEX: How THE MEESE
COMMISSION LIED ABOUT PORNOGRAPHY 224-25 (1986). The New York Times opined,
"[T]he report, widely circulated without formal publication, must be faulted for relying
on questionable evidence and recklessly encouraging censorship." Defeated by Pornugra·
phy, N.Y. Times, June 21, 1986, at Al6, col. 1. Washington Post columnist William
Raspberry praised the dissenting Commissioners for their "intellectual honesty, professional integrity and guts," and their refusal to be "buffaloed into unsupported conclusions." Raspberry, Pornography Report, Wash. Post, May 26, 1986, at A21, col. 4. Another Washington Post columnist, Richard Cohen, ridiculed the Commission's discovery
of a causal link between pornography and violence as "more a wish than a scientific
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rejected, by a wide margin, a public referendum on an ordinance
similar to the one adopted in Indianapolis. 23 A broad range of
feminist organizations opposed the ordinance. 2 • In 1986, citizens
of Maine voted nearly three-to-one against adoption of an obscenity law;211 women's organizations in Maine strongly opposed
the proposal. 26
The feminists of FACT have helped to transform the contemporary dialogue about pornography. That debate no longer pits
victimized women and conventional moralists against
pornographers and civil libertarians. FACT affirms that sexuality is, for women, a source of pleasure and power, as well as a
realm of danger and oppression. As a consequence, discussion of
pornography and sexuality is more intricately contextualized
and appropriately complex. The brief that follows aspires to
keep open the discussion about sexual explicitness and to assert
that sexually explicit materials have both liberating and repressive qualities. The feminist analysis of these issues remains far
from complete. As Carole S. Vance, one of the founders of
FACT, observes, "The hallmark of sexuality is its complexity: its
multiple meanings, sensations, and connections."27
Despite the contradictory strands in the feminist approach,
the empirical and intellectual exploration of sexuality remains a
finding." Cohen, Pornography: The 'Causal Link,' Wash. Post, June 3, 1986, at A19, col.
2. Chicago Tribune columnist Mike Royko observed:
[I]n recent years there have been more than 220 bombings of abortion clinics. . . . Those who have been arrested have expressed deep religious
convictions. . . .
(E]xtremist groups shoot rural sheriffs, talk show hosts and lawyers they suspect of being liberal. They, too, spout religious devotion.
So maybe we should begin considering the outlawing of religion because it is
the root cause of so much violence.
Royko, Nobody Euer Got Raped by a Book, Chicago Trib., June 11, 1986, at 1, col. 3.
23. Anti-Pornography Law Defeated in Cambridge, N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1985, at
A16, col. 6.
24. FACT, Boston Chapter; The Boston Women's Health Book Collective; Boston
NOW; Women Against Violence Against Women, Boston Chapter; Cambridge Commission on the Status of Women; No Bad Women, Just Bad Laws (statements on file with
the U. MICH. J.L. REF.).
25. Wald, Voters in Maine Defeat Anti-Obscenity Plan, N.Y. Times, June 11, 1986,
at A32, col. 4. For ballot purposes, the four-and-a-half-page statute was reduced to the
proposition, "Do you want to make it a crime to make, sell, give for value or otherwise
promote obscene material in Maine?" Id.
26. Wald, Obscenity Debate Focuses Attention on Maine, Where Voters Weigh Issue, N.Y. Times, June 10, 1986, at Al8, col. 1.
27. Vance, Pleasure and Danger: Toward a Politics of Sexuality, in PLEASURE AND
DANGER, supra note 2, at 5.
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central enterprise for the contemporary feminist movement. 28
Sexual ideas, images, and practices have been dominated by and
oriented toward men and are often not responsive to women. 29
Many women experience sexual failure and frustration, rather
than ecstasy and pleasure. Furthermore, feminism's core insight
emphasizes that gender is socially defined. Social and sexual role
acculturation largely determine gender differences; accordingly,
these differences are not natural or immutable. In Simone de
Beauvoir's classic words, "One is not born, but rather becomes, a
woman. " 30 Social ideas and material arrangements give deep
meaning to masculinity and femininity. The social significance
of gender is fabricated to favor men systematically through economic, political, and legal structures that rest upon and reinforce gender. Sexual desire, both powerful and pliable, forms a
part of that gender system. Discovering, describing, and analyzing the complex interaction of gender and sexuality, of representation and reality, thus remains a key project of feminist theory
and lives.

supra note 4;
supra note 2; WOMEN AGAINST CENSORSHIP, supra note 6.
29. See Keodt, The Myth of the Vaginal Orgasm, in NOTES FROM THE SECOND YEAR:
WOMEN'S LIBERATION 37 (S. Firestone ed. 1970), and in VOICES FROM WoMEN's LIBERA28.

For three excellent feminist collections, see POWERS OF DESIRE,

PLEASURE AND DANGER,

158 (L. Tanner ed. 1971); M. SHERFEY, THE NATURE AND EVOLUTION OF FEMALE SEX(1972); L. BARBACH, FOR YOURSELF: THE FULFILLMENT OF FEMALE SEXUALITY
(1971).
30. S. DE BEAUVOIR, supra note 3, at 273.
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IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 84-3147
AMERICAN BOOKSELLERS ASSOCIATION, INC., et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.
WILLIAM H. HUDNUT III, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants.
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Indiana
BRIEF AMICI CURIAE OF
FEMINIST ANTI-CENSORSHIP TASKFORCE, et al.
NAN D. HUNTER
132 W. 43rd Street
New York, N.Y. 10036
(212) 944-9800
SYLVIA A. LAW
40 Washington Square South
New York, N.Y. 10003
(212) 598-7642
April 8, 1985
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Interest of Amici
Amici are feminists who sign this brief as a statement of our
opposition to the Indianapolis ordinance. We believe that the ordinance reinforces rather than undercuts central sexist stereotypes in our society and would result in state suppression of sexually explicit speech, including feminist images and literature,
which does not in any way encourage violence against women.
We condemn acts of violence against women; incitement to that
violence; and misogyny, racism, and anti-semitism in all media.
We believe, however, that the Indianapolis ordinance will not reduce violence against women and will censor speech and imagery
that properly belong in the public realm. Some proponents of
this ordinance genuinely believed that it would assist women to
overcome disabling sex role stereotypes and promote greater
equality for women. We who sign this brief are deeply concerned
that it will have precisely the opposite effect.
THE FEMINIST ANTI-CENSORSHIP TASKFORCE
(FACT) is a group of women long active in the feminist movement who organized in 1984 to oppose the enactment of Indianapolis-style antipornography laws. It is composed of community
activists, writers, artists and teachers.
THE WOMEN'S LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, Inc. (WLDF) is
a non-profit tax-exempt organization of over 1500 members
founded to further women's rights and to challenge sex-based
inequities through the law, especially in the area of employment
discrimination and domestic relations. WLDF volunteer and
staff attorneys conduct public education about women's rights
and sex discrimination; counsel thousands of individual women
annually about their rights; represent victims of sex discrimination in selected precedent-setting cases; and advocate on behalf
of laws guaranteeing sex-based equality before legislative and
executive branch policymakers and as amicus curiae in numerous court cases.
ROBERTA ACHTENBERG is the Directing Attorney of the
Lesbian Rights Project in San Francisco and the Editor of Sexual Orientation and the Law (Clark Boardman 1985). She was
formerly Dean of New College of California School of Law.
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DENNIS ALTMAN is a Policy Fellow, University of California at San Francisco, in the Institute for Health Policy Studies
and is the author of four books. He was Regents lecturer, University of California at Santa Cruz, 1983.
NANCY K. BEREANO is Editor and Publisher of Firebrand
Books. Prior to that position, she was Editor of the Feminist
Series for Crossing Press.
JOAN E. BIREN (JEB) is a freelance photographer and the
author of Eye to Eye: Portraits of Lesbians. She has been a feminist activist for fifteen years.
BETTY BROOKS, Ed. D., is the Director of the Southern
California Rape Hotline Alliance Self-Defense Certification Program, a member of the American College of Sexologists, and
founder of Women Against Sexual Abuse. She recently organized a FACT chapter in Los Angeles.
RITA MAE BROWN is a well-known author whose works include Rubyfruit Jungle, Southern Discomfort, and Sudden
Death.
ARLENE CARMEN is Program Associate at Judson Memorial Church in New York City, where she directs a minis1;,ry to
street prostitutes. She is co-author of Abortion Counseling and
Social Change (Judson Press 1973) and Working Women: The
Subterranean World of Street Prostitution, scheduled to be published in August 1985.
DENISE S. CARTY-BENNIA is a Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law, and an active participant in
movements opposing sex and race discrimination in the United
States.
CHERYL L. CLARKE is a Black feminist lesbian poet,
writer, and member of the editorial collective of Conditions
Magazine.
MICHELLE CLIFF is the author of Claiming an Identity
They Taught Me to Despise and Abeng. She is a member of
Poets & Writers and The Authors Guild.
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THE EDITORS OF CONDITIONS MAGAZINE-Founded
in 1976, Conditions magazine is a feminist magazine of writing
by women with an emphasis on writing by lesbians. The current
editors are Dorothy Allison, Cheryl Clarke, Nancy Clarke Otter,
and Debby Schaubman.
RHONDA COPELON is an Associate Professor of Law, City
University of New York Law School at Queens College. For the
past fifteen years, she has litigated civil rights and women's
rights cases as an attorney with the Center for Constitutional
Rights.
ROSEMARY DANIELL is a full-time writer. Her books include A Sexual Tour of the Deep South (poetry, 1975); Fatal
Flowers: On Sin, Sex, and Suicide in the Deep South (non-fiction, 1980); and Sleeping with Soldiers (non-fiction, 1985).
PEGGY C. DAVIS, Assistant Professor, New York University
Law School, is a former Judge of the New York Family Court
and has worked in many efforts for racial and gender equality.
JOHN D'EMILIO, Ph. D., is an Assistant Professor of History
at the University of North Carolina in Greensboro and the author of Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities (University of Chicago Press 1983).
BETTY DODSON is an artist, writer, publisher, and teacher.
She has spent eleven years organizing sexual enhancement workshops for women. Her book, Self-Love and Orgasm, has sold
200,000 copies.
MARY C. DUNLAP is a law teacher and solo practitioner of
civil law. She was co-founder and attorney-teacher at Equal
Right Advocates, Inc., San Francisco, from 1973 to 1978. She is
co-author of a chapter on the First Amendment in Sexual Orientation and the Law (Clark Boardman 1985).
THOMAS I. EMERSON, Lines Professor of Law, Emeritus,
Yale University School of Law, has written extensively on the
First Amendment and is co-author of The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80
Yale L.J. 871 (1971).
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SUSAN ESTRICH, Assistant Professor of Law, Harvard Law
School, has written in the area of sex discrimination.
MARY L. FARMER is a lesbian feminist activist and bookstore owner in Washington, D.C.
ANNE. FREEDMAN, Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School,
Camden, was a co-founder of the Women's Law Project, Philadelphia. She is co-author of The Equal Rights Amendment: A
Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 Yale L.J.
871 (1971), and of Sex Discrimination and the Law: Causes and
Remedies (1975).
ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN is Associate Professor of History
at Stanford University and Director of the Feminist Studies
Program there. She is the author of Their Sisters' Keepers, a
history of women's prison reform, and of articles on the history
of sexuality.
BETTY FRIEDAN is the author of The Feminine Mystique
and The Second Stage. She was founding president of the National Organization for Women, a founding member of the National Women's Political Caucus, and is presently co-chair of the
National Commission for Women's Equality of the American
Jewish Congress.
JEWELLE L. GOMEZ is a critic for the Village Voice, Wellesley Women's Review of Books, and Hurricane Alice (in Minneapolis). She is a Program Associate for the New York State
Council on the Arts.
BETTE GORDON is an Assistant Professor of Film at Hofstra University in New York and an independent filmmaker. Her
work has been exhibited at international film festivals in
Cannes, Berlin, Florence, and Los Angeles, and is currently featured in New York, Paris, and Sydney, Australia.
LINDA GORDON is a Professor of History at the University
of Wisconsin-Madison. She is the author of Woman's Body,
Woman's Right: A History of Birth Control in the US, America's
Working Women, and of numerous articles on the history of
feminism and on family violence and the feminist response.
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VIVIAN GORNICK is a feminist author and journalist whose
works include Woman in Sexist Society: Essays in Feminism, In
Search of Ali Mahmoud: An American Woman in Egypt, and
Women in Science.
LYNN A. HAANEN is serving her third term on the Dane
County (Wisconsin) Board of Supervisors and is a co-founder of
FACT in Madison, Wisconsin, formed to raise concerns about
antipornography and censorship measures.
CAROLYN HEILBRUN is Professor of English at Columbia
University and an author.
DONNA J. HITCHENS is an attorney now in private practice
in San Francisco, formerly the Directing Attorney of the Lesbian
Rights Project and a staff attorney with Equal Rights
Advocates.
AMBER HOLLIBAUGH was a founding member of the first
Boston battered women's shelter and an organizer with Californians for Education Against the Briggs Initiative/Prop 6.
JOAN W. HOWARTH is currently the police practices attorney for the ACLU Foundation of Southern California. In 1976,
she helped to establish Women Against Violence Against
Women (WAVAW) and was active in that group until 1982.
DAVID KAIRYS is a writer, teacher, and attorney in Philadelphia and editor of The Politics of Law.
E. ANN KAPLAN is an Associate Professor at Rutgers University, where she teaches literature and film. She is the author
of Women and Film: Both Sides of the Camera (Methuen 1983)
and of other books and articles dealing with women's studies.
JONATHAN N. KATZ is the author of Gay American History
and the Gay/Lesbian Almanac.
VIRGINIA KERR is Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School.
NORMAN LAURILA co-owns and manages a gay and lesbian
bookstore in New York City called "A Different Light," which
also has a branch in Los Angeles.
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HOW ARD LESNICK is a Distinguished Professor of Law,
City University of New York Law School at Queens College.
LONG HAUL PRESS is a lesbian-feminist press in New
York.
PHYLLIS LYON, Ed. D.; is co-author of Lesbian/Woman.
She is a Human Rights Commissioner in San Francisco and a
professor at the Institute for Advanced Study in Human
Sexuality.
DEL MARTIN is the author of Battered Wives. She is also a
member of the California Commission on Crime Control and Violence Prevention.
JUDITH McDANIEL, Ph. D., is a poet, novelist, teacher, and
political activist. She is Program Director for the Albany, N.Y.
Non-Violence Project.
KATE MILLETT is the author of Sexual Politics, The Prostitution Papers, Flying, and Sita.
JOAN NESTLE is a writer and co-founder of the Lesbian
Herstory Educational Foundation, Inc./The Lesbian Herstory
Archives. For the last nineteen years she has taught writing in
the SEEK Program at Queens College and at the City University of New York.
ESTHER NEWTON, Ph.D., is an Associate Professor of Anthropology and Coordinator of Women's Studies, State University of New York College at Purchase.
LYNN M. PALTROW is an attorney working at the National
Abortion Rights Action League through the Georgetown University Women's Law and Public Policy Fellowship Program.
RANDOLPH J. PERITZ is a Professor of Law at Rutgers
Law School, Camden.
ROSALIND PETCHESKY is an Associate Professor of Political Theory at Ramapo College of New Jersey. She is the author
of Abortion and Woman's Choice (Northeastern University
Press 1984) and has published numerous articles on women's reproductive rights and feminist theory.
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FELICE PICANO is founder and publisher of The SeaHorse
Press and co-founder and publisher of Gay Presses of New York.
He is the author of ten books, including Eyes, The Lure, and
Slashed to Ribbons & Other Stories.
MINNIE BRUCE PRATT teaches in the Women's Studies
Program, University of Maryland-College Park. She is the author of two books of poetry, The Sound of One Fork and We Say
We Love Each Other, and co-author of Yours in Struggle: Three
Feminist Perspectives on Anti-Semitism and Racism.
JANE B. RANSOM has been active in reproductive rights issues as a member of the Committee for Abortion Rights and
Against Sterilization Abuse, of the staff of the Center for Constitutional Rights, and of the board of the Brooklyn Teen Pregnancy Network.
RAYNA RAPP, Ph. D., is an Associate Professor and Chair of
the Department of Anthropology Graduate Faculty at the New
School for Social Research. She is editor of Toward an Anthropology of Women (1975) and co-author, with Ellen Ross, of Sex
and Society: A Research Note from Cultural Anthropology and
Social History (1981).
JUDITH RESNICK is Associate Professor of Law at the University of Southern California Law Center and author of articles
on the role of federal courts and on the problems faced by
women in prison.
ADRIENNE RICH is widely known as a lesbian feminist poet
and writer. Her books include Of Woman Born: Motherhood as
Experience and Institution (1974); On Lies, Secrets and Silence
(essays, 1979); and The Fact of a Doorframe: Poems 1950-1984.
She is an A.D. White Professor-at-Large at Cornell University
(1981-1987) and has been a part-time lecturer in English at San
Jose State University since 1984. Ms. Rich is a member of
P.E.N. and The Authors Guild.
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INTRODUCTION
The instant case involves the constitutionality of an anti-pornography ordinance enacted by the City Council of Indianapolis,
City-County Ordinance No. 35, 1984. The ordinance was ruled
unconstitutional by the U.S. District Court on a motion for summary judgment. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 598 F.
Supp. 1316 (S.D. Ind. 1984).
Amici believe that the ordinance violates both the First
Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech and the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantee of equal treatment under the law. Under
its trafficking provision, the ordinance would allow injunctions
to issue against the distribution, sale, exhibition or production of
any sexually explicit materials Which fall within its definition of
pornography. No showing of harm to the plaintiff (individual or
class) is required as proof prior to the issuance of such an injunction. Because the trafficking provision and the definition
most flagrantly violate constitutional principles, this brief concentrates its focus on those two aspects of the ordinance.

xxm
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THE ORDINANCE SUPPRESSES CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED
SPEECH IN A MANNER PARTICULARLY DETRIMENTAL TO WOMEN.

Although Appellants argue that the ordinance is designed to
restrict images which legitimate violence and coercion against
women, the definition of pornography in the ordinance is not
limited to images of violence or of coercion, or to images produced by women who were coerced. Nor is it limited to materials
which advocate or depict the torture or rape of women as a form
of sexual pleasure. It extends to any sexually explicit material
which an agency or court finds to be "subordinating" to a claimant acting on behalf of women and which fits within one of the
descriptive categories which complete the definition of
pornography.
For purposes of the trafficking cause of action, the ordinance
defines pornography as the "graphic sexually explicit subordination of women, whether in pictures or in words, that also includes one or more" of the depictions described in six categories.1 The violent and brutal images which Appellants use as
illustrative examples2 cannot obscure the fact that the ordinance
(1) Women are presented as sexual objects who enjoy pain or humiliation; or
(2) Women are presented as sexual objects who experience sexual pleasure in being raped; or
(3) Women are presented as sexual objects tied up or cut up or mutilated or
bruised or physically hurt, or as dismembered or truncated or fragmented or
severed into body parts; or
(4) Women are presented being penetrated by objects or animals; or
(5) Women are presented in scenarios of degradation, injury, abasement, torture,
shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a context that makes
these conditions sexual; or
(6) Women are presented as sexual objects for domination, conquest, violation,
exploitation, possession, or use, or through postures or positions of servility or
submission or display.
Indianapolis, Ind., Code § 16-3(q) (1984).
2. By the use of highly selected examples, Appellants and supporting amici convey
the impression that the great majority of materials considered pornographic are brutal.
Although most commercial pornography, like much of all media, is sexist, most is not
violent. A study of pictorials and cartoons in Playboy and Penthouse between 1973 and
1977 found that, by 1977, about 5% of the pictorials were rated as sexually violent. "No
significant changes in the percentage of sexually violent cartoons were found over the
years." Malamuth & Spinner, A Longitudinal Content Analysis of Sexual Violence in the
Best-Selling Erotic Magazines, 16 J. Sex. Research 226, 237 (1980). The Women Against
Pornography (W.A.P.) amicus brief, in particular, totally mischaracterizes content analyses of pornography. It asserts, at p. 8 n.14, that one study found the depictions of rape in
"adults only" paperbacks had doubled from 1968 to 1974, a statement which is simply
false. The study found that the amount of explicit sexual content had doubled, but also
1.

1
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authorizes suppression of material that is sexually explicit, but
in no way violent. The language of the definition mixes phrases
that have clear meanings and thus ascertainable applications
(e.g., "cut up or mutilated") with others which are sufficiently
elastic to encompass almost any sexually explicit image that
someone might find offensive (e.g., "scenarios of degradation" or
"abasement"). The material that could be suppressed under the
latter category is virtually limitless.
While the sweep of the ordinance is breathtaking, it does not
address (nor would Amici support state suppression of) the far
more pervasive commercial images depicting women as primarily
concerned with the whiteness of their wash, the softness of their
toilet tissue, and whether the lines of their panties show when
wearing tight slacks. Commercial images, available to the most
impressionable young children during prime time, depict women
as people interested in inconsequential matters who are incapable of taking significant, serious roles in societal decisionmaking.
The constitutionality of the ordinance depends on the assumption that state agencies and courts can develop clear legal
definitions of terms like "sexually explicit subordination," "sexual object," and "scenarios of degradation" and "abasement." In
truth, these terms are highly contextual and of varying meanings. Worse, many of their most commonly accepted meanings
would, if applied in the context of this ordinance, reinforce
rather than erode archaic and untrue stereotypes about women's
sexuality.

"that the plots, themes, and stories have remained much the same in these books
throughout the years measured in this study." Smith, The Social Content of Pornography, 26 J. Comm. 16, 23 (1976). The brief then cites a study finding that depictions of
bondage and domination in Times Square pornography stores "had increased dramatically in frequency by 1982," but neglects to mention that the increase was to 17.2%. The
same study also concluded that "many bondage and domination magazines do not depict
suffering or bodily injury." Dietz & Evans, Pornographic Imagery and Prevalence of
Paraphilia, 139 Am. J. Psychiatry 1493, 1495 (1982). That some pornography would be
found by amici on both sides to be offensive to women does not support this legislative
approach to curtailing that pornography, which is overbroad and dependent on suppression of speech.

2
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A. Historically the Law Has Incorporated a Sexual Double
Standard Denying Women's Interest in Sexual Expression.
Traditionally, laws regulating sexual activity were premised
upon and reinforced a gender-based double standard which
assumed:
that women are delicate, that voluntary sexual intercourse may harm them in certain circumstances and that
they may be seriously injured by words as well as deeds.
The statutes also suggest that, despite the generally delicate nature of most women, there exists a class of women
who are not delicate or who are not worthy of protection.
[By contrast, the law's treatment of male sexuality reflected] the underlying assumption that only males have
aggressive sexual desires [and] hence they must be restrained . . . . The detail and comprehensiveness of
[such] laws suggest that men are considered almost
crazed by sex.
K. Davidson, R. Ginsburg & H. Kay, Sex-Based Discrimination
892 (1st ed. 1974).

The Indianapolis ordinance is squarely within the tradition of
the sexual double standard. It allows little room for women to
openly express certain sexual desires and resurrects the notion
that sexually explicit materials are subordinating and degrading
to women. Because the "trafficking" cause of action allows one
woman to obtain a court order suppressing images which fall
within the ordinance's definition of pornography, it implies that
individual women are incapable of choosing for themselves what
they consider to be enjoyable, sexually arousing material without
being degraded or humiliated.
The legal system has used many vehicles to enforce the sexual
double standard which protected "good" women from both sexual activity and explicit speech about sex. For example, the common law of libel held that "an oral imputation of unchastity to a
woman is actionable without proof of damage. . . . Such a rule
never has been applied to a man, since the damage to his reputation is assumed not to be as great." W. Prosser, Law of Torts,
759-60 (1971).

The common law also reinforced the image of "good" women
as asexual and vulnerable by providing the husband, but not the
3

FACT Brief

FALL 1987-WINTER 1988]

103

wife, remedies for "interference" with his right to sole possession
of his wife's body and services. The early writ of "ravishment"
listed the wife with the husband's chattels. To this day, the action for criminal conversation allows the husband to maintain an
action for trespass, not only when his wife is raped
but also even though the wife had consented to it, or was
herself the seducer and had invited and procured it, since
it was considered that she was no more capable of giving
a consent which would prejudice the husband's interests
than was his horse .
Id. at 874-77.
While denying the possibility that "good" women could be
sexual, the common law dealt harshly with the "bad" women
who were. Prostitution laws often penalized only the woman,
and not the man, and even facially neutral laws were and are
enforced primarily against women. See, e.g., Jennings, The Victim as Criminal: A Consideration of California's Prostitution
Law, 64 Calif. L. Rev. 1235 (1976). Prostitution is defined as
"the practice of a female offering her body to indiscriminate sexual intercourse with men," 63 Am. Jur. 2d Prostitution § 1
(1972), or submitting "to indiscriminate sexual intercourse
which she invites or solicits." Id. A woman who has sexual relations with many men is a "common prostitute" and a criminal
while a sexually active man is considered normal.
The sexual double standard is applied with particular force to
young people. Statutory rape laws often punished men for consensual intercourse with a female under a certain age. Comment,
The Constitutionality of Statutory Rape Laws, 27 UCLA L. Rev.
757, 762 (1980). Such laws reinforce the stereotype that in sex
the man is the offender and the woman the victim, and that
young men may legitimately engage in sex, at least with older
people, while a young woman may not legally have sex with
anyone.
The suppression of sexually explicit material most devastating
to women was the restriction on dissemination of birth control
information, common until 1971. In that year, the Supreme
Court held that the constitutional right to privacy protects an
unmarried person's right to access to birth control information.
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). To deny women access
to contraception "prescribe[s] pregnancy and the birth of an un4
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wanted child as punishment for fornication." Id. at 448. For the
previous century, the federal Comstock law, passed in 1873, had
prohibited mailing, transporting or importing "obscene, lewd or
lascivious" items, specifically including all devices and information pertaining to "preventing contraception and producing
abortion." 8 Women were jailed for distributing educational
materials regarding birth control to other women because the
materials were deemed sexually explicit in that they "contain[ed] pictures of certain organs of women" and because the
materials were found to be "detrimental to public morals and
welfare." People v. Byrne, 99 Misc. 1, 6 (N.Y. 1917).
The Mann Act also was premised on the notion that women
require special protection from sexual activity. 35 Stat. 825
(1910), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2422. It forbids interstate transportation of women for purposes of "prostitution, debauchery, or any
other immoral purposes," and was enacted to protect women
from reportedly widespread abduction by bands of "white
slavers" coercing them into prostitution. As the legislative history reveals, the Act reflects the assumption that women have no
will of their own and must be protected against themselves. See
H.R. Rep. No. 47, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. (1910), at 10-11. Like the
premises underlying this ordinance, the Mann Act assumed
that women were naturally chaste and virtuous, and that
no woman became a whore unless she had first been
raped, seduced, drugged or deserted. [Its] image of the
prostitute . . . was of a lonely and confused fem ale . . . .
[Its proponents] maintained that prostitutes were the
passive victims of social disequilibrium and the brutality
of men . . . . [Its] conception of female weakness and
male domination left no room for the possibility that
prostitutes might consciously choose their activities.
3. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1461-1462 (West 1984); 19 U.S.C.A. § 1305 (West 1980 & Supp.
1984); see United States v. One Obscene Book Entitled "Married Love", 48 F.2d 821
(S.D.N.Y. 1931); United States v. One Book Entitled "Contraceptions", 51 F.2d 525
(S.D.N.Y. 1931) (prosecution for distribution of books by Marie Stopes on contraception); United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1930) (prosecution of Mary Ware
Dennett for publication of pamphlet explaining sexual physiology and functions to children); and Bours v. United States, 229 F. 960 (7th Cir. 1915) (prosecution of physician
for mailing a letter indicating that he might perform a therapeutic abortion). It was not
until 1971 that an amendment was passed deleting the prohibition as to contraception,
Pub. L. No. 91-662, 84 Stat. 1973 (1971); and the ban as to abortion remains in the
current codification of the law.

5

FALL 1987-WINTER 1988]

FACT Brief

105

Note, The White Slave Traffic Act: The Historical Impact of a
Criminal Law Policy on Women, 72 Geo. L.J. 1111 (1984).
The Mann Act initially defined a "white slave" to include
"only those women or girls who are literally slaves-those
women who are owned and held as property and chattels . . .
those women and girls who, if given a fair chance, would, in all
human probability, have been good wives and mothers," H.R.
Rep. No. 47, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., at 9-10 (1910). Over the years,
the interpretation and use of the Act changed drastically to punish voluntary "immoral" acts even when no commercial intention or business profit was involved. See Caminetti v. United
States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917); Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S.
14 (1946).
The term 'other immoral acts' was held to apply to a variety of activities: the interstate transportation of woman to work as a chorus girl in a theatre where the woman was exposed to smoking, drinking, and cursing; a
dentist who met his young lover in a neighboring state
and shared a hotel room to discuss her pregnancy; two
students at the University of Puerto Rico who had sexual
intercourse on the way home from a date; and a man and
woman who had lived together for four years and traveled around the country as man and wife while the man
sold securities.

a

Note, supra, at 1119.
Society's attempts to "protect" women's chastity through
criminal and civil laws have resulted in restrictions on women's
freedom to engage in sexual activity, to discuss it publicly, and
to protect themselves from the risk of pregnancy. These disabling restrictions reinforced the gender roles which have oppressed women for centuries. The Indianapolis ordinance resonates with the traditional concept that sex itself degrades
women, and its enforcement would reinvigorate those discriminatory moral standards which have limited women's equality in
the past.
6
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B. The Ordinance Is Unconstitutionally Vague Because Context Inescapably Determines the Effect of Sexual Texts and
Images.
The ordinance authorizes court orders removing from public
or private availability "graphic sexually explicit" words and
images which "subordinate" women. A judge presented with a
civil complaint filed pursuant to this law would be required to
determine whether the material in question "subordinated"
women. To equate pornography with conduct having the power
to "subordinate" living human beings, whatever its value as a
rhetorical device, requires a "certain sleight of hand" to be incorporated as a doctrine of law. American Booksellers Ass'n v.
Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316, 1330 (S.D. Ind. 1984). Words and
images do influence what people think, how they feel, and what
they do, both positively and negatively. Thus pornography may
have such influence. But the connection between fantasy or symbolic representation and actions in the real world is not direct or
linear. Sexual imagery is not so simple to assess. In the sexual
realm, perhaps more so than in any other, messages and their
impact on the viewer or reader are often multiple, contradictory,
layered and highly contextual.
The film Swept Away illustrates that serious problems of context and interpretation confound even the categories which on
first reading might seem reasonably easy to apply. Made in 1975
by Italian director Lina Wertmuller, Swept Away tells a powerful story of dominance and submission. A rich attractive woman
and a younger working class man are first shown as class antagonists during a yachting trip on which the man is a deckhand and
the woman a viciously rude boss, and then as sexual antagonists
when they are stranded on a Mediterranean island and the man
exacts his revenge. During the second part of the film, the man
rapes the woman and repeatedly assaults her. She initially resists, then falls in love with him, and he with her.
Scenes in Swept Away clearly present the woman character as
"experienc[ing] sexual pleasure" during rape. In addition, she is
humiliated, graphically and sexually, and appears to grow to enjoy it. Although sexually explicit depictions are not the majority
of scenes, the film as a whole has an active sexual dynamic.
Given the overall and pervasive theme of sexual dominance and
submission, it is improbable that the explicit scenes could be
7
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deemed "isolated." It is virtually certain that the film could be
suppressed under the ordinance since it was shown in laboratory
studies cited by Appellants to measure negative impact of aggressive erotic materials.'
Swept Away is an example of graphic, sexually explicit images
and characterizations used to treat themes of power imbalance,
to push at the edges of what is thought to be acceptable or desirable, and to shock. Critical and popular opinions of the film varied, ranging from admiration to repulsion:~ Whatever one's interpretation of the film, however, its profoundly important
themes entitle it to a place in the realm of public discourse.
Context often determines meaning. Whether a specific image
could be found to "subordinate" or "degrade" women may depend entirely on such factors as the purpose of the presentation;
the size and nature of the audience; the surrounding messages;
the expectation and attitude of the viewer; and where the presentation takes place, among others. 8 Yet the trafficking provision
allows blanket suppression of images based on highly subjective
criteria which masquerade as simple, delineating definitions.
4. See Appellants' Exh. S. at 114-15.
5. The reviewer for Ms. Magazine wrote:
At several points I was very offended by the idea of love won by brute
force. . . . I'd like to explain this away by stressing that this is an allegory of
class war, not sex war. But that is not true. For the brilliance of "Swept Away"
is that it is everything at once. As a description of what capitalism does to us it
is sophisticated and deep. At the same time, it comes to grips with the "war"
between the sexes better than anything I've seen or read. . . . It has shocking
scenes linking sex and violence and yet it is about tenderness. . . . [It] is a
funny, beautiful, emotional movie about a somber, ugly, intellectual subject.
Garson, A Reviewer Under the Influence, Ms. Magazine, Dec. 1975, at 37, 38.
Other reviewers strongly disagreed:
I really don't know what is more distasteful about this film-its slavish adherence to the barroom credo that all women really want is to be beaten, to be
shown who's boss, or the readiness with which it has been accepted by the critics. Yes, it is effective enough in parts, but strictly on the level of slick
pornography.
Turan, Not Swept Away, The Progressive, May 1976, at 39, 40.
6. The same theme may be perceived very differently in different contexts. In her
novel, A Sea Change, feminist author Lois Gould repeatedly invokes fantasies and
images of rape and submission in order to make more dramatic her story of women
transforming their sexual lives. One striking passage narrates the main female character
being stroked and then entered by the gun held by a fantasy male character, B.G.
L. Gould, A Sea Change 95 (1977). At the end of the novel, the woman character becomes B.G. This graphic depiction of penetration by an object, undoubtedly suppressible
under the ordinance, especially since there are several scenes in· the book which could
meet the definition of pornography, is one of the fantasies Gould explores and uses in
her treatment of the theme of sexual power.

8
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C. The Ordinance Is Unconstitutionally Vague Because Its
Central Terms Have No Fixed Meaning, and the Most Common Meanings of These Terms Are Sexist and Damaging to
Women.
The ordinance's definition of pornography, essential to each
cause of action, is fatally flawed. It relies on words often defined
in ways that reinforce a constricted and constricting view of
women's sexuality. Thus Amici fear that experimentations in
feminist art which deal openly and explicitly with sexual themes
will be easily targeted for suppression under this ordinance.
The central term "sexually explicit subordination" is not defined. 7 Appellants argue that "subordination" means that which
"places women in positions of inferiority, loss of power, degradation and submission, among other things." Appellants' brief at
26. The core question, however, is left begging: what kinds of
sexually explicit acts place a woman in an inferior status? Appellants argued in their brief to the District Court that "[t]he
mere existence of pornography in society degrades and demeans
all women." Defendants' memorandum at 10. To some observers, any graphic image of sexual acts is "degrading" to women
and hence would subordinate them. To some, the required element of subordination or "positions of . . . submission" might
be satisfied by the image of a woman lying on her back inviting
intercourse, while others might view the same image as affirming
women's sexual pleasure and initiative. Some might draw the
line at acts outside the bounds of marriage or with multiple
partners. Others might see a simple image of the most traditional heterosexual act as subordinating in presenting the man
in a physical position of superiority and the woman in a position
of inferiority.
In any of these contexts, it is not clear whether the ordinance
is to be interpreted with a subjective or an objective standard. If
a subjective interpretation of "subordination" is contemplated,
the ordinance vests in individual women a power to impose their
views of politically or morally correct sexuality upon other
women by calling for repression of images consistent with those
7. To define "pornography" as that which subordinates women, and then prohibit as
pornographic that which subordinates, makes the claim that pornography subordinates
either circular or logically trivial.

9
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views. The evaluative· terms-subordination, degradation, abasement-are initially within the definitional control of the plaintiff, whose interpretation, if colorable, must be accepted by the
court. An objective standard would require a court to determine
whether plaintiff's reaction to the material comports with some
generalized notion of which images do or do not degrade women.
It would require the judiciary to impose its views of correct sexuality on diverse community. The inevitable result would be to
disapprove those images that are least conventional and privilege those that are closest to majoritarian beliefs about proper
sexuality.
Whether subjective or objective, the inquiry is one that plainly
and profoundly threatens First Amendment freedoms and is totally inconsistent with feminist principles, as they are understood by Amici. Sexuality is particularly susceptible to extr~mely charged emotions, including feelings of vulnerability and
power. The realm of image judgment opened by the ordinance is
too contested and sensitive to be entrusted to legislative categorization and judicial enforcement.
The danger of discrimination is illustrated by the probability
that some women would consider any explicit lesbian scene as
subordinating, or as causing "[their] dignity [to] suffer," Appellants' brief at 36. Appellants plainly intend to include same-sex
depictions, since their carefully selected trial court exhibits include such materials. 8 Lesbians and gay men9 encounter massive
discrimination based on prejudice related to their sexuality. 10
The trafficking provision of the ordinance virtually invites new
manifestations of this prejudice by means of civil litigation
against the erotica of sexual minorities.

a

8. See, e.g., Appellants' Exhs. N., M., and W. These exhibits, like most commercial
pornography which depicts sex between women, were not produced by or primarily for
lesbians. Yet part of the shock value of such images in contemporary society may be
attributable to their depiction of sexual explicitness between women. When the door is
opened to suppress "scenarios of degradation," for example, there is no guarantee that
this shock value of any graphic depiction of homosexual acts will not spill over to images
and texts which authentically express lesbian sexuality.
9. The provision that "the use of men ... in the place of women . . . shall also
constitute pornography" makes clear that same-sex male images and texts could fall
within the scope of the ordinance, especially so, one supposes, if one male partner is
depicted as effeminate.
10. See, e.g., Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982), on appeal; People v.
Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1980); National Gay Task
Forcev. Board of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'd per curiam, 53 U.S.L.W.
4408 (U.S. Mar. 26, 1985).

10
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The six subsections of the definition applicable to a trafficking
complaint provide no clarification. The term "sexual object," for
example, appears frequently in the definition. Appellants are
confident that "the common man knows a sex object when he
sees one." Appellants' brief at 40. Yet, although "sex object"
may be a phrase which has begun to enjoy widened popular usage, its precise meaning is far from clear. Some persons maintain
that any detachment of women's sexuality from procreation,
marriage, and family objectifies it, removing it from its "natural" web of association and context. When sex is detached from
its traditional moorings, men allegedly benefit and women are
the victims. 11 Feminists, on the other hand, generally use the
term "sex object" to mean the absence of any indicia of personhood, a very different interpretation.
Appellants argue that the meaning of "subordination" and
"degradation" can be determined in relation to "common usage
and understanding." Appellants' brief at 33. But as we have
seen, the common understanding of sexuality is one that incorporates a sexual double standard. Historically, virtually all sexually explicit literature and imagery has been thought to be degrading or abasing or humiliating, especially to women.
The interpretation of such morally charged terms has varied
notoriously over time and place. A state supreme court thirty
years ago ruled that the words "obscene, lewd, licentious, indecent, lascivious, immoral, [and] scandalous" were "neither vague
nor indefinite" and had "a meaning understood by all." State v.
Becker, 364 Mo. 1079, 1087, 272 S.E.2d 283, 288 (1954). See also
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 518 (1948). In Kansasv.
Great American Theatre Co., the court accepted as a definition
for "prurient interest," "an unhealthy, unwholesome, morbid,
degrading, and shameful interest in sex," 227 Kan. 633, 633, 608
P.2d 951, 952 (1980) (emphasis added). A Florida obscenity statute which declared it to be "unlawful to publish, sell[, etc.] any
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent, immoral, degrading,
sadistic, masochistic or disgusting bookm 2 was found to be no
longer adequate after the decision in Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476 (1957), absent both a contemporary definition of those
terms and a standard based on the materials' overall value and
11. See, e.g., G. Gilder, Sexual Suicide (1973).
12. Act of June 20, 1957 ch. 57-779, § 1, 1957 Fla. Laws vol. 1, pt. 1, 1102, 1103-04
(amending Fla. Stat. § 847.01) (amended 1959, repealed 1961) (emphasis added).
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not just their explicitness. 18 After Roth and subsequent decisions, the statute was amended three times to incorporate these
additional elements. 14 Upon amending the statute in 1961, the
word "degrading" was dropped. Words like "degradation,"
"abasement," and "humiliation" have been used in the past synonymously with subjective, moralistic terms. There is no reason
to believe that the language in this ordinance will be magically
resistant to that kind of interpretation.
The First Amendment prohibits any law regulating expression
which would of necessity result in such unpredictable and arbitrary interpretations. This ordinance transgresses all three of the
measures of impermissible vagueness. A person of ordinary intelligence would be at a loss to predict how any of a huge range of
sexually explicit materials would be interpreted by a court.
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972); Smith v.
Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 (1974); Kolender v. Lawson, 461
U.S. 352, 357 (1983). Protected expression would be chilled because the makers, distributors, and exhibitors of sexually explicit works would be induced to practice self-censorship rather
than risk potentially endless lawsuits under this ordinance.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 41 (1976); Smith v. Goguen, 415
U.S. at 573. Lastly, the absence of reasonably clear guidelines
for triers of fact would open the door to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the ordinance. Id.; Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. at 108; Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. at 358;
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 168-69 (1972).
The ordinance requires enforcement of "common understandings" of culturally loaded terms. It perpetuates beliefs which undermine the principle that women are full, equal, and active
agents in every realm of life, including the sexual.

13. See State v. Cohen, 125 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 1960); State v. Reese, 222 So. 2d 732
(Fla. 1969); and Rhodes v. State, 283 So. 2d 351 (Fia. 1973).
14. See Act of May 5, 1961, ch. 61-7, 1961 Fla. Laws vol. 1, pt. 1, 13; Act of June 3,
1969, ch.69-41, 1969 Fla. Laws vol. 1, pt.I, 164; Act of June 7, 1973, ch. 73-120, 1973 Fla.
Laws 185.
•
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D. Sexually Explicit Speech Does Not Cause or Incite Violence
in a Manner Sufficiently Direct to Justify Its Suppression
Under the First Amendment.
To uphold this ordinance and the potential suppression of all
speech which could be found to fall within its definition of pornography, this court must invent a new exception to the First
Amendment. To justify that, Appellants must show that the
speech to be suppressed will lead to immediate and concrete
harm. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Collin v.
Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916
(1978). Only a small number of social science studies which purport to show a connection between violent pornography and negative attitudes and behavior toward women have been offered to
support this position. For many reasons, their effort must fail.
Substantively, the studies relied upon do not justify the
sweeping suppression authorized by the ordinance. Appellants
cite the social science data in highly selective and grossly distorting ways. They fail to acknowledge that most of it is limited
to studies of a narrow class of violent imagery. The ordinance,
by contrast, both leaves untouched most of the images which
may be said to cause negative effects and would allow the suppression of many images which have not been shown to have any
harmful effect. Appellants also fail to mention that the "debriefing" phase of the cited experiments suggests that negative
changes in attitudes may be corrected through further speech.
They seek to create the false impression that new social science
data have completely refuted the finding in 1971 by the Presidential Commission on Obscenity and Pornography that pornography was not harmful. However, as Professor Edward Donnerstein wrote in the study placed before the District Court by
Appellants as Exh. T. at 127-28,
One should not assume . . . that all the research since
the commission's time has indicated negative effects [of
pornographic materials] on individuals. In fact, this is
quite to the contrary. . . . (A] good amount of research
strongly supports the position that exposure to certain
types of erotica can reduce aggressive responses in people
who are predisposed to aggression. The reader should
13
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keep in mind the fact that erotica has been shown to
have many types of effects.
Lastly, whatever Appellants' claims, numerous methodological
problems make these studies too unreliable as predictors of real
world behavior to sustain the withdrawal of constitutional protection from what is now permitted speech.
Although the ordinance authorizes suppression of far more
than simply violent images, the limited findings of a linkage between sexually explicit materials and a willingness to aggress
against women under laboratory conditions have occurred only
in studies of "aggressive pornography," defined as a particular
scenario: "depictions in which physical force is used or
threatened to coerce a woman to engage in sexual acts (e.g.
rape)." Appellants' Exh. S. at 105. This limiting definition is
used by both Professor Donnerstein and Professor Neil
Malamuth in the recently published book, Pornography and
Sexual Aggression. See Malamuth, Aggression Against Women:
Cultural and Individual Causes, in Pornography and Sexual Aggression 19, 29-30 (N. Malamuth & E. Donnerstein eds. 1984);
Donnerstein, Pornography: Its Effect on Violence Against
Women, in Pornography and Sexual Aggression, supra, at 53, 63.
Where nonaggressive pornography is studied, no effect on aggression against women has been found; it is the violent, and not
the sexual, content of the depiction that is said to produce the
effects. 111 Further, all of the aggression studies have used visual
imagery; none has studied the impact of only words. Finally,
even as to violent "aggressive pornography," the results of the
studies are not uniform. 16
15.

Studies have indicated that if you take out the explicit sexual content from
aggressive pornographic films, leaving just the violence (which could be shown
on any network television show), you find desensitization to violent acts in some
subjects. However, if you take out the aggressive component and leave just the
sexual, you do not seem to observe negative effects of desensitization to violence
against women. Thus, violence is at issue here. That is why restrictions or censorship solutions are problematical.
Donnerstein & Linz, Debate on Pornography, Film Comment, Dec. 1984, at 34, 35.
16. Malamuth describes a study he did in which no evidence was found of changes in
perceptions or attitudes following exposure to this type of pornography:
One group of male and female subjects looked at issues of Penthouse and Playboy magazines that showed incidents of sadomasochism and rape. A second
group examined issues of these magazines that contained only non-aggressive
pornography and a third group was given only neutral materials. Shortly afterward, subjects watched an actual videotaped interview with a rape victim and
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Violent and misogynist images are pervasive in our culture.
Nothing in the research cited by Appellants proves their hypothesis that these messages are believed in a qualitatively different way when they are communicated through the medium of
sexually explicit material. Both Professors Donnerstein and
Malamuth have noted that regulation of imagery targeted at the
sexually explicit misses the core of the problem:
Images of violence against women are not the sole property of aggressive or violent pornography. Such images
are quite pervasive in our society. Images outside of the
pornographic or X-rated market may in fact be of more
concern, since they are imbued with a certain "legitimacy" surrounding them and tend to have much wider
acceptance.
Sexist attitudes, callous attitudes about rape, and
other misogynist values are just as likely to be reinforced
by non-sexualized violent symbols as they are by violent
pornography.
Donnerstein & Linz, supra p. 14, at 35 (emphasis added).
Attempts to alter the content of mass media ... cannot
be limited to pornography, since research has documented similar effects from mainstream movies. In addition, other mass media forms, such as advertisements,
television soap operas, and detective magazines, to name
a few, also contain undesirable images of violence against
women. The most pertinent question on the issue of
changing mass media content may not be where we draw
the line between pornography and non-pornography but
how we can best combat violence against women in its
myriad forms.
Malamuth & Lindstrom, Debate on Pornography, Film Comment, Dec. 1984, at 39, 40.
responded to a questionnaire assessing their perceptions of a rape victim and her
experience. Weeks later ... subjects indicated their views on rape in response
to a newspaper article. Exposure to the aggressive pornography did not affect
perceptions of rape either in response to the videotaped interview with a rape
victim or to the newspaper article.
Appellants' Exh. S. at 113.
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When "more speech" can be an effective means of countering
prejudicial and discriminatory messages, the First Amendment
forbids the use of censorship to suppress even the most hateful
content. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 916 (1978). The social science data upon which Appellants rely so heavily indicate that further speech can remove the
negative effects on attitude registered after viewing certain kinds
of violent pornography. Malamuth and Donnerstein both conduct "debriefing" sessions at the conclusion of their experiments. In these sessions, the purposes of the studies are explained to the subjects, and information is presented to dispel
rape myths. The effectiveness of the debriefing sessions is then
tested up to four months later. "The findings of these studies
indicated consistently that the education interventions were successful in counteracting the effects. of aggressive pornography
and in reducing beliefs in rape myths." Malamuth, supra p. 14,
at 46.
Censorship is not the solution. Education, however, is a
viable alternative. Early sex education programs which
dispel myths about sexual violence and early training in
critical viewing skills could mitigate the influence of
these films.
Donnerstein & Linz, supra p. 14, at 35.
This debriefing effect demonstrates that the changes in attitude
shown from pornography are not permanent or, as Appellants
contend, conditioned.
The substance of the social science data provides no support
for the broad suppression of speech authorized by the ordinance.
Further, even if the ordinance were narrowly limited to the "aggressive pornography" which has been studied, limits in the
methodology fatally undermine Appellants' claims that even this
violent material causes the sort of concrete, immediate harm
that could justify creating a new exception to the First
Amendment.
Behavior under laboratory conditions cannot predict behavior
in life with the degree of accuracy and specificity required to
justify a censorship law. The college students being studied in
these laboratory tests knew that their actions would have no actual negative impact on real people. Indeed, the experimental
16
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setting may induce conduct in subjects that they would not otherwise exhibit. In the words of one theorist:
Laboratory studies that deliberately lower restraints
against aggression . . . may be seen as representing a reversal of the normal socialization process. After a subject
has been angered, he is allowed (actually told) to attack
his adversary. The victim emits no pain cues ... and the
subject not only feels better but learns that, in this laboratory situation, aggression is permissible and socially approved (i.e. condoned by the experimenter).
Donnerstein, supra p. 14, at 60.
Moreover, most of the reported willingness to aggress occurs
only in subjects who are previously angered as part of the experiment shortly before they are asked to administer shocks. See
generally Donnerstein, supra p. 14. Some researchers believe
that the anger is the primary factor producing the manifestation
of aggression. See Gray, Exposure to Pornography and Aggression Toward Women: The Case of the Angry Male, 29 Soc.
Probs. 387 (1982).
Additionally, in most studies cited, aggressive behavior occurs
only when the experimenter gives subjects disinhibitory cues indicating that such behavior is acceptable, and not when the experimenter provides an inhibitory communication.
These data highlight the important role of situational
factors in affecting aggression against women and suggest
that, while cultural factors such as aggressive pornography may increase some males' aggressive tendencies, the
actual expression of aggressive responses may be strongly
regulated by varied internal and external (i.e., situational) variables.
Malamuth, supra p. 14, at 35.
In life, more than in a laboratory, a multitude of interacting
factors shape behavior, including early childhood experiences,
family dynamics, religious training, formal education, and one's
perceived relation to governmental structures and the legal system, as well as the entire range of media stimuli. 17 It is difficult
17. See also Abramson & Hayashi, Pornography in Japan: Cross-Cultural and Theoretical Considerations, in Pornography and Sexual Aggression 173 (N. Malamuth & E.
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even in the laboratory to identify a single "cause" for behavior. 18
Every study finding a negative effect under laboratory conditions from viewing an image cannot be grounds for rewriting the
First Amendment.
Appellants and supporting amici also claim a causal connection between the availability of pornography and rape. Such a
claim is implausible on its face. Acts of rape and coercion long
preceded the mass distribution of pornography, and in many
cultures pornography is unavailable, yet the incidence of rape,
Donnerstein eds. 1984). Japanese pornography contains more depictions of rape and
bondage than does American pornography and is also more readily available in popular
magazines and on television. Yet, Japan has a substantially lower incidence of rape than
any western country and a lower incidence of violent crime generally. The authors attribute the lower crime rate to cultural factors unrelated to pornography.
18. A good example of the limitations of laboratory studies is provided by the study
described in Appellants' Exh. R. Male subjects viewed violent "slasher" movies, one a
day for five consecutive days, and answered questions each day about the extent to
which the film was degrading to women. The subjects clearly knew that attitudes related
to sexual violence against women were being measured. On the last day of the experiment, subjects were informed that the sixth and final film had not arrived. They were
told since their original film did not arrive they would watch a law school documentary
about a rape trial. After viewing the rape documentary, subjects completed questionnaires. The authors concluded that "exposed subjects later judged the victim of a violent
assault and rape to be significantly less injured and generally more worthless than a
control group of subjects who saw no films." Appellants' Exh. R., abstract.
Appellants cite this study in support of their claim that "pornography" makes men
"less able to perceive that an account of rape is an account of rape." Appellants' brief at
20. The study is of limited value. First, the images used in the slasher films are not
within the ordinance's definition of pornography. Second, there is a high probability that
"demand characteristics"-where subjects understand the purpose of a study and give
the experimenter what he or she is thought to be looking for-skewed the responses.
Third, the term "worthless" did not occur spontaneously to the subjects, but was suggested by a question asking, "I felt [the victim) was: valuable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 worthless."
Thus, when the authors state that subjects who viewed the films found the victim "more
worthless," they mean that the subjects circled the number 6, say, instead of the number
4. The question regarding the perception of the victim's injury was presented in a similar
manner. What is being measured in studies of this type are not complex sets of attitudes,
such as all of us have in real life, but gross responses on a questionnaire. Fourth, although the authors found "significant differences" between subjects who had viewed the
films and those who had not on the "injury" and "worthlessness" measures, they did not
find significant differences on other measures including defendant intention, victim resistance, victim responsibility, victim sympathy, and victim unattractiveness. Finally, an
hypothesized correlation between perception of violence and perception of degradation
proved to be non-significant, as did the expected correlation between perception of degradation and enjoyment of the film. The point is not that this is poor social science
research, but that this kind of research does not produce evidence sufficiently strong to
justify censorship.
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and of discrimination against women generally, is high. 19 The
converse is also true; that is, there are places where pornography
is widely available, and the incidence of rape is low compared to
the United States.
Many studies have focused on Denmark to discern whether
their abolition of the laws restricting pornography in the mid1960's could be linked to any changes in behavior. Numerous
conflicting arguments have been made as to the implications of
the Danish experience. In 1979, the British Committee on Obscenity and Film Censorship published a report critically reviewing extensive data on the asserted linkage between pornography
and sexual violence. Because it was done a decade after the
American report, it includes much of the recent work published
on this topic. The Committee found "no support at all" for the
thesis that the availability of pornography in Denmark could be
linked to an increase in sexual offenses. "It is impossible to discern a significant trend in rape which could be linked in any way
to the free availability of pornography since the late 1960s." Obscenity and Film Censorship 83 (B. Williams ed. 1979).
Appellants' argument that pornography should be precluded
from First Amendment protection would require this Court to
find that it causes harm in the direct, immediate way that
falsely shouting fire in a crowded theater does. The social science data upon which they rely lend no support to such a claim.
The findings relate to only a small portion of the material which
the ordinance would suppress, results of the studies are mixed,
and even the data which report laboratory findings of aggression
cannot be used blithely to predict behavior in the real world.
E. Constitutional Protection for Sexually Explicit Speech
Should Be Enhanced, Not Diminished.
Sexually explicit speech which is judged "obscene" is not protected under the First Amendment. Miller v. California, 413
19. Even the Baron and Strauss chapter, Sexual Stratification, Pornography, and
Rape in the United States, in Pornography and Sexual Aggression, cited by the W.A.P.
amicus brief at 16, which found, in a state-by-state analysis, a positive correlation between circulation rates for mainstream pornographic magazines (e.g., Playboy) and incidents of rape, could not explain some strikingly anomalous results, such as, for example,
Utah, which ranked 51st (last) in per capita readership of sex magazines, but 25th in per
capita rate of rape.
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U.S. 15 (1973). Appellants seek to vitiate the protection currently afforded non-obscene sexual speech on the ground that
any expression falling within the scope of this ordinance "is not
the free exchange of ideas." Appellants' brief at 12. They ask
this Court to rule that all sexually explicit speech is disfavored:
It is essential to look at the nature of the material regulated to measure the importance of the chilling effect. . . . [T]he ordinance reaches 'sexually explicit activity.' . . . The Supreme Court has determined that
"there is ... a less vital interest in the uninhibited exhibition of material that is on the borderline between pornography and artistic· expression than in the free dissemination of ideas of social and political significance." The
message of Young is that it is constitutional for anyone
who steps too close to the line to take the risk of crossing
it when sexually explicit material is involved. The chilling effect is simply not entitled to great weight in this
context.
Appellants' brief at 53 (citations omitted).
The argument that the First Amendment provides less protection for sexual images than for speech which is "political" misunderstands both the value of free expression and the political
content of sexually explicit speech. Many justifications support
free expression: our incapacity to determine truth without open
discussion; the need for people to communicate to express self
identity and determine how to live their lives; the inability of
the censor to wield power wisely.
Further, sexual speech is political. One core insight of modern
feminism is that the personal is political. The question of who
does the dishes and rocks the cradle affects both the nature of
the home and the composition of the legislature. The dynamics
of intimate relations are likewise political, both to the individuals involved and by their multiplied effects to the wider society. 20 To argue, as Appellants do, that sexually explicit speech is
less important than other categories of discourse reinforces the
conceptual structures that have identified women's concerns
20. Even clearly misogynist pornography is political speech. Indeed, antipornography
activists have often argued that pornography is political propaganda for male dominance.
One lawyer then associated with Women Against Pornography pointed out that the political message of pornography hostile to women results in its entitlement to heightened,
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with relationships and intimacy as less significant and valuable
precisely because those concerns are falsely regarded as having
no bearing on the structure of social and political life.
Depictions of ways of living and acting that are radically different from our own can enlarge the range of human possibilities
open to us and help us grasp the potentialities of human behavior, both good and bad. Rich fantasy imagery allows us to experience in imagination ways of being that we may not wish to experience in real life. Such an enlarged vision of possible realities
enhances our human potential and is highly relevant to our decision-making as citizens on a wide range of social and ethical
issues.
For sexual minorities, speech describing conduct can be a
means of self-affirmation in a generally hostile world. Constrictions on that speech can deny fundamental aspects of self-identity. Cf. Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel., 24 Cal.
3d 458, 488, 594 P.2d 592, 611, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14, 33 (1979). In
Rowland v. Mad River Local School District, 730 F.2d 444 (6th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 53 U.S.L.W. 3614 (U.S. Feb. 26, 1985), a
public employee was fired from her job because she confided .in
coworkers that she was bisexual. Although her statement resulted in no disruption of the workplace, the Court of Appeals
ruled that it was constitutionally permissible to fire her "for
talking about it." Id. at 450. Yet, as in Gay Law Students Association, the speech should have been considered political:
I think it is impossible not to note that a . . . public debate is currently ongoing regarding the rights of homosexuals. The fact of petitioner's bisexuality, once spoken,
necessarily and ineluctably involved her in that debate.
Speech that "touches upon" this explosive issue is no less
deserving of constitutional attention than speech relating
to more widely condemned -forms of discrimination.
Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., 53 U.S.L.W. at 3615
(Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
not lesser, First Amendment protection as a form of advocacy, albeit of noxious ideas.
Kaminer, Pornography and the First Amendment: Prior Restraints and Private Action,
in Take Back the Night: Women and Pornography 239-46 (1980).
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Thus, sexually explicit expression, including much that is covered by the ordinance, carries many more messages than simply
the misogyny described by Appellants. It may convey the message that sexuality need not be tied to reproduction, men, or domesticity. It may contain themes of sex for no reason other than
pleasure, sex without commitment, and sexual adventure-all of
which are surely ideas. Cf. Kingsley Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S.
684 (1959).
Even pornography which is problematic for women can be experienced as affirming of women's desires and of women's
equality:
Pornography can be a psychic assault, both in its content
and in its public intrusions on our attention, but for
women as for men it can also be a source of erotic pleasure. A woman who is raped is a victim; a woman who enjoys pornography (even if that means enjoying a rape
fantasy) is in a sense a rebel, insisting on an aspect of her
sexuality that has been defined as a male preserve. Insofar as pornography glorifies male supremacy and sexual
alienation, it is deeply reactionary. But in rejecting sexual repression and hypocrisy-which have inflicted even
more damage on women than on men-it expresses a
radical impulse.
Willis, Feminism, Moralism and Pornography, in Powers of Desire: The Politics of Sexuality 460, 464 (A. Snitow, C. Stansell &
S. Thompson eds. 1983). Fantasy is not the same as wish fulfillment. See N. Friday, My Secret Garden: Women's Secret Fantasies (1973) and Forbidden Flowers: More Women's Sexual Fantasies (1975). But one cannot fully discuss or analyze fantasy if
the use of explicit language is precluded.
The range of feminist imagination and expression in the realm
of sexuality has barely begun to find voice. Women need the
freedom and the socially recognized space to appropriate for
themselves the robustness of what traditionally has been male
language. Laws such as the one under challenge here would constrict that freedom. See Blakely, Is One Woman's Sexuality Another Woman's Pornography?, Ms. Magazine, Apr. 1985, at 37.
Amici fear that as more women's writing and art on sexual
22
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themes 21 emerge which are unladylike, unfeminine, aggressive,
power-charged, pushy, vulgar, urgent, confident, and intense, the
traditional foes of women's attempts to step out of their "proper
place" will find an effective tool of repression in the Indianapolis
ordinance.
II.

THE ORDINANCE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY DISCRIMINATES ON
THE BASIS OF SEX AND REINFORCES SEXIST STEREOTYPES.

The challenged ordinance posits a great chasm-a categorical
difference-between the make-up and needs of men and of
women. It goes far beyond acknowledgment of the differences in
life experiences which are inevitably produced by social structures of gender inequality. The ordinance presumes women as a
class (and only women) are subordinated by virtually any sexually explicit image. It presumes women as a class (and only
women) are incapable of making a binding agreement to participate in the creation of sexually explicit material. And it
presumes men as a class (and only men) are conditioned by sexually explicit depictions to commit acts of aggression and to believe misogynist myths.
Such assumptions reinforce and perpetuate central sexist stereotypes; they weaken, rather than enhance, women's struggles
to free themselves of archaic notions of gender roles. In so doing,
this ordinance itself violates the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In treating women as a special class, it
repeats the error of earlier protectionist legislation which gave
women no significant benefits and denied their equality.
21. The following are among the works which could fall within the scope of the ordinance's definition and thus be suppressed pursuant to the trafficking cause of action: K.
Acker, Blood and Guts in High School (1984); Bad Attitude (Quarterly, Boston); L.
Barbach, Pleasures: Women Write Erotica (1984); A Woman's Touch (Cedar & Nelly
eds. 1979); J. Chicago, The Dinner Party (1979); T. Corinne & J. Lapidus, Yantras of
Women Love (1982); N. Friday, My Secret Garden: Women's Sexual Fantasies (1973)
and Forbidden Flowers: More Women's Sexual Fantasies (1975); L. Gould, A Sea Change
(1977); E. Jong, Fear of Flying (1973) and How to Save Your Own Life (1976); Kensington Ladies Erotica Society, Ladies Home Erotica (1984); S. Kitzinger, Women's Experience of Sex (1983); R. Mapplethorpe, Lady Lisa Lyon (1983); K. Millett, Sita (1976); A.
Nin, Delta of Venus (1977); Olds, Bestiary, in Powers of Desire: The Politicsof Sexuality
supra p. 22, at 409; A. Oakgrove~aging Peace (1984); J. Rechy, City of Night
(1963); Coming to Power (Samois ed. 1982); Shulman, A Story of a Girl and Her Dog, in
Powers of Desire: The Politics of Sexuality, supra, p. 22 at 410.
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A. The District Court Erred in Accepting Appellants' Assertion
That Pornography Is a Discriminatory Practice Based on
Sex.
The ordinance is predicated on a finding that:
Pornography is a discriminatory practice based on sex
which denies women equal opportunities in society. Pornography is central in creating and maintaining sex as a
basis for discrimination. . . . [It harms] women's opportunities for equality of rights in employment, education,
access to and use of public accommodations, and acquisition of real property; promote[s] rape, battery, child
abuse, kidnapping and prostitution and inhibit[s] just
enforcement of laws against such acts .
Indianapolis, Ind., Code § 16-l(a)(2).
The District Court accepted that finding, but held that First
Amendment values outweighed the asserted interest in protecting women. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp.
1316, 1335-37 (S.D. Ind. 1984).
Amici dispute the City and County's "finding" that "pornography is central in creating and maintaining sex as a basis for
discrimination." There was no formal, or indeed informal, legislative fact-finding process leading to this conclusion. Rather, legislators who had previously opposed obscenity on more traditional and moralistic grounds adopted a "model bill"
incorporating this finding. 22 The model bill was in turn based on
legislative hearings, held in Minneapolis, which did not, in fairness, reflect a reasoned attempt to understand the factors "central" in maintaining "sex as a basis for discrimination. " 23 See
Appellants' brief at 15 n.6.
It is true that sex discrimination takes multiple forms, which
are reflected in the media. But the finding that "pornography is
central in creating and maintaining sex as a basis for discrimina22. Duggan, Censorship in the Name of Feminism, Village Voice, Oct. 16, 1984, at 15,
col. 1.
23. Courts may not defer to legislative determination of fact when the supposed
"facts" are marshaled to suppress free speech or to justify sex discrimination. "Deference
to a legislative finding cannot limit judicial inquiry when First Amendment rights are at
stake," Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843 (1978). See also
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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tion" does not represent our best understanding of the complex,
deep-seated and structural causes of gender inequality. In the
past decade, many people have grappled with the question of
causation. Feminist law professors and scholars have published
and revised collections of cases and materials. K. Davidson, R.
Ginsberg & H. Kay, supra p. 3 (1974 & 2d ed. 1981); B. Babcock,
A. Freedman, E. Norton & S. Ross, Sex Discrimination and the
Law: Causes and Remedies (1974 & Supp. 1978). The factors
they find most significant include: the sex segregated wage labor
market; systematic devaluation of work traditionally done by
women; sexist concepts of marriage and family; inadequate income maintenance programs for women unable to find wage
work; lack of day care services and the premise that child care is
an exclusively female responsibility; barriers to reproductive
freedom; and discrimination and segregation in education and
athletics. 24 Numerous feminist scholars have written major
works tracing the cultural, economic, and psychosocial roots of
women's oppression. 211
Misogynist images, both those which are sexually explicit and
the far more pervasive ones which are not, reflect and may help
to reinforce the inferior social and economic status of women.
But none of these studies and analyses identifies sexually explicit material as the central factor in the oppression of women.
History teaches us that the answer is not so simple. Factors far
more complex than pornography produced the English common
law treatment of women as chattel property and the enactment
of statutes allowing a husband to rape or beat his wife with impunity. In short, the claim that "pornography is central in creating and maintaining sex as a basis of discrimination" is flatly
inconsistent with the conclusions of most who have studied the
question.
Amici also dispute the "finding" that pornography, as defined
by the ordinance, is "a discriminatory practice ... which denies
24. See also U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Women and Poverty (1974); Women
Still in Poverty (1979); and Child Care and Equal Opportunity for Women (1981) and
National Advisory Council on Economic Opportunity, Final Report: The American
Promise: Equal Justice and Economic Opportunity (1981).
25. See, e.g., Toward an Anthropology of Women (R. Reiter ed. 1975); M. Rosaldo &
L. Lamphere, Women, Culture and Society (1974); M. Ryan, Womanhood in America:
From Colonial Times to the Present (1979); N. Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender (1978); D. Dinnerstein, The Mermaid
and the Minotaur: Sexual Arrangements and Human Malaise (1976); J. Mitchell,
Women's Estate (1972).
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women equal opportunities." Images and fictional text are not
the same thing as subordinating conduct. The ordinance does
not target discriminatory actions denying access to jobs, education, public accommodations, or real property. It prohibits
images. Although ideas have impact, images of discrimination
are not the discrimination.
Further, the ordinance is cast in a form very different from
the traditional antidiscrimination principles embodied in the
Constitution and federal civil rights laws. Antidiscrimination
laws demand equality of treatment for men and women, blacks
and whites. The ordinance, by contrast, purports to protect
women. It assumes that women are subordinated by sexual
images and that men act uncontrollably if exposed to them. Sexist stereotypes are thus built into its very premises, and, as we
demonstrate infra, its effect will be to reinforce those
stereotypes.
Hence, the District Court misperceived this case as one requiring the assignment of rank in a constitutional hierarchy. It
is not necessary to rule that either gender equality or free speech
is more important. The ordinance is fatally flawed not only because it authorizes suppression of speech protected by the First
Amendment but also because it violates the constitutional guarantee of sex-based equality.
B. The Ordinance Classifies on the Basis of Sex and Perpetuates Sexist StereotYPes.

The ordinance defines pornography in gender specific terms as
"the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women" that also
presents "women" in particular ways proscribed by the law. The
District Court found:
[t]he Ordinance seeks to protect adult women, as a
group, from the diminution of the legal and sociological
status as women, that is from the discriminatory stigma
which befalls women as women as a result of
'pornography.'
American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. at 1335
(emphasis supplied).
26
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The heart of the ordinance is the suppression of sexually explicit images of women, based on a finding of "subordination," a
term which is not defined. The ordinance implies that sexually
explicit images of women necessarily subordinate and degrade
women and perpetuates stereotypes of women as helpless victims and people who could not seek or enjoy sex.
The ordinance also reinforces sexist stereotypes of men. It denies the possibility that graphic sexually explicit images of a
man could ever subordinate or degrade him. It provides no remedy for sexually explicit images showing men as "dismembered,
truncated or fragmented" or "shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding, bruised or hurt."
The stereotype that sex degrades women, but not men, is underscored by the proviso that "the use of men, children, or
transsexuals in the place of women ... also constitutes pornography." Indianapolis, Ind., Code§ 16-3(q). The proviso does not
allow men to claim that they, as men, are injured by sexually
explicit images of them. Rather men are degraded only when
they are used "in place of women." The ordinance assumes that
in sexuality, degradation is a condition that attaches to women. 26
The ordinance authorizes any woman to file a complaint
against those trafficking in pornography "as a woman acting
against the subordination of women." A man, by contrast, may
obtain relief only if he can "prove injury in the same way that a
woman is injured." Indianapolis, Ind., Code § 16-17(a)(7)(b).
Again the ordinance assumes that women as a class are subordinated and hurt by depictions of sex, and men are not.
The ordinance reinforces yet another sexist stereotype of men
as aggressive beasts. Appellants assert:
By conditioning the male orgasm to female subordination, pornography . . . makes the subordination of
women pleasurable and seemingly legitimate. Each time
men are sexually aroused by pornography, they learn to
connect a woman's sexual pleasure to abuse and a woman's sexual nature to inferiority. They learn this in
their bodies, not just their minds, so that it becomes a
26. Appellants explain that the proviso is needed because "without it, pornographers
could circumvent the ordinance by producing the exact same material using models
other than adult biological females, i.e., men, children, and transsexuals, to portray
women." Appellants' brief at 45.

27
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natural physiological response. At this point pornography
leaves no more room for further debate than does shouting "kill" to an attack dog.
Appellants' brief at 21.
Men are not attack dogs, but morally responsible human beings. The ordinance reinforces a destructive sexist stereotype of
men as irresponsible beasts, with "natural physiological responses" which can be triggered by sexually explicit images of
women, and for which the men cannot be held accountable.
Thus, men are conditioned into violent acts or negative beliefs
by sexual images; women are not. Further, the ordinance is
wholly blind to the possibility that men could be hurt and degraded by images presenting them as violent or sadistic.
The ordinance also reinforces sexist images of women as incapable of consent. It creates a remedy for people "coerced" to
participate in the production of pornography. Unlike existing
criminal, tort, and contract remedies against coercion, the ordinance provides:
proof of the following facts or conditions shall not constitute a defense: that the person actually consented . . .;
or, knew that the purpose of the acts or events in question was to make pornography; or demonstrated no resistance or appeared to cooperate actively in the photographic sessions or in the sexual events that produced the
pornography; or . . . signed a contract, or made statements affirming a willingness to cooperate in the production of pornography.
Indianapolis, Ind., Code § 16-3.(5)(A) VIII-XI.
In effect, the ordinance creates a strong presumption that
women who participate in the creation of sexually explicit material are coerced. 27 A woman's manifestation of consent-no matter how plain, informed, or even self-initiated-does not constitute a defense to her subsequent claim of coercion. Women are
judged incompetent to consent to participation in the creation of
sexually explicit material and condemned as "bad" if they do so.
27. The provisions negating common law defenses to coercion are cast in facially neutral terms. But since "pornography" is defined in gender specific terms, the provisions
abrogating defenses to coercion also apply to women or to others used "in the place of
women."

28
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Appellants argue that this provision is justified by Supreme
Court precedent allowing suppression of sexually explicit material involving children. They assert that women, like children,
"are incapable of consenting to engage in pornographic conduct,
even absent a showing of physical coercion and therefore require
special protection. . . . The coercive conditions under which
most pornographic models work make this part of the law one
effective address to the industry." [Sic.] Appellants' brief at 17.
This provision does far more than simply provide a remedy to
women who are pressured into the creation of pornography
which they subsequently seek to suppress. It functions to make
all women incompetent to enter into legally binding contracts
for the production of sexually explicit material. When women
are legally disabled from making binding agreements, they are
denied power to negotiate for fair treatment and decent pay. Enforcement of the ordinance would drive production of sexually
explicit material even further into an underground economy,
where the working conditions of women in the sex industry
would worsen, not improve.
C. The Ordinance Is Unconstitutional Because It Reinforces
Sexist Stereotypes and Classifies on the Basis of Sex.
In recent years, the Supreme Court has firmly and repeatedly
rejected gender-based classifications, such as that embodied in
the ordinance. The constitutionally protected right to sex-based
equality under law demands that:
the party seeking to uphold a statute that classifies individuals on the basis of their gender must carry the burden of showing an "exceedingly persuasive justification"
for the classification. . . . The burden is met only by
showing at least that the classification serves "important
governmental objectives and that the discriminatory
means employed" are "substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives."
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724-25
(1982).
The sex-based classifications embodied in the statute are justified on the basis of stereotypical assumptions about women's
29
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vulnerability to sexually explicit images and their production
and men's latent uncontrollability. But the Supreme Court has
held that, "[This standard] must be applied free of fixed notions
concerning the roles and abilities of males and females. Care
must be taken in ascertaining whether the statutory objective
itself reflects archaic and stereotypic notions." Id. Gender-based
classifications cannot be upheld if they are premised on " 'old
notions' and 'archaic and overbroad' generalizations" about the
roles and relative abilities of men and women." Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 217 (1977).
-The ordinance damages individuals who do not fit the stereotypes it embodies. It delegitimates and makes socially invisible
women who find sexually explicit images of women "in positions
of display" or "penetrated by objects" to be erotic, liberating, or
educational. These women are told that their perceptions are a
product of "false consciousness" and that such images are so inherently degrading that they may be suppressed by the state. At
the same time, it stamps the imprimatur of state approval ori
the belief that men are attack dogs triggered to violence by the
sight of a sexually explicit image of a woman. It delegitimates
and makes socially invisible those men who consider themselves
gentle, respectful of women, or inhibited about expressing their
sexuality.
Even worse, the stereotypes of the ordinance perpetuate traditional social views of sex-based difference. By defining sexually
explicit images of woman as subordinating and degrading to
them, the ordinance reinforces the stereotypical view that
"good" women do not seek and enjoy sex. 28 As applied, it would
deny women access to sexually explicit material at a time in our
28. Perpetuating the stereotype that "good girls" do not enjoy sex, and suppressing
images of women's sexuality, is particularly tragic for teenagers. A recent study by the
prestigious Alan Guttmacher Institute identifies factors explaining why teenagers in the
United States experience unwanted pregnancy at rates significantly higher than those in
any other developed nation. This extensive study found that the single most important
factor associated with low rates of unwanted pregnancy is "openness about sex (defined
on the basis of four items: media presentations of female nudity, the extent of nudity on
public beaches, sales of sexually explicit literature and media advertising of condoms)."
The researchers conclude:
American teenagers seem to have inherited the worst of all possible worlds regarding their exposure to messages about sex: Movies, music, radio and TV tell
them that sex is romantic, exciting, titillating. . . . Yet, at the same time, young
people get the message good girls should say no. Almost nothing that they see or
hear about sex informs them about contraception or the importance of avoiding
pregnancy. . . . Such messages lead to an ambivalence about sex that stifles
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history when women have just begun to acquire the social and
economic power to develop our own images of sexuality. Stereotypes of hair-trigger male susceptibility to violent imagery can
be invoked as an excuse to avoid directly blaming the men who
commit violent acts.
Finally, the ordinance perpetuates a stereotype of women as
helpless victims, incapable of consent, and in need of protection.
A core premise of contemporary sex equality doctrine is that if
the objective of the law is to " 'protect' members of one gender
because they are presumed to suffer from an inherent handicap
or to be innately inferior, the objective itself is illegitimate."
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725. We have
learned through hard experience that gender-based classifications protecting women from their own presumed innate vulnerability reflect "an attitude of 'romantic paternalism' which, in
practical e:ffect, puts women not on a pedestal but in a cage."
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973).
The coercion provisions of the ordinance "protect" by denying
women's capacity to voluntarily agree to participate in the creation of sexually explicit images. The trafficking provisions "protect" by allowing women to suppress sexually explicit speech
which the ordinance presumes is damaging to them. The claim
that women need protection and are incapable of voluntary action is familiar. Historically, the presumed "natural and proper
timidity and delicacy" of women made them unfit "for many of
the occupations of civil life," and justified denying them the
power to contract. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130,
141-42 (1872).
Until quite recently, the law commonly provided women special protections against exploitation. In 1936, the Supreme Court
upheld a law establishing minimum wages for women saying,
"What can be closer to the public interest than the health of
women and their protection from unscrupulous and overreaching
employers?" West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398
(1936). In 1948, the Court approved a law banning women from
work as bartenders as a legitimate measure to combat the
communication and exposes young people to increased risk of pregnancy, out-ofwedlock births and abortions.
Jones, Forrest, Goldman, Heusbaw, Livecloer, Rosoff, Westoff, & Wolf, Teenage Pregnancy in Developed Countries: Determinants and Policy Implications, 17 Family Plan.
Persp., Mar.-Apr. 1985, at 53, 61.
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"moral and social problems" to which bartending by women
might give rise. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948). The
protectionist premise of these cases is now discredited and their
holdings repudiated.
Women were, and continue to be, in a position of social and
economic vulnerability that inhibits their ability to negotiate
fair terms and conditions of wage labor. Further, the pervasive
sexism and violence of our culture make women vulnerable to
exploitation and inhibit their ability to enter into sexual or other
relationships on a free and voluntary basis.
Slavery and free self-actualization are opposite poles on a continuum. Both free agency and response to external pressure are
simultaneous aspects of human action. In the 1930's, employers
challenged minimum wage and hour laws saying that laborers
"freely consented" to work twelve hours a day, under dangerous
and harmful conditions, for wages that did not provide minimal
subsistence. We understand today that this concept of voluntary
consent is self-serving and empty. Similarly, many women engage in sex or in the production of sexually explicit materials in
response to pressures so powerful that it would be cynical to
characterize their actions as simply voluntary and consensual.
. Still, the laws that "protected" only women from exploitation
in wage labor hurt them. B. Babcock, A. Freedman, E. Norton &
S. Ross, supra p. 25, at 48, 191-217. Many employers responded
by barring women from the best paying jobs with the greatest
opportunity for advancement. Further, the protective labor laws
reinforced general beliefs about women's vulnerability and incompetence. Similarly here, the protection of the ordinance reinforces the idea that women are incompetent, particularly in relation to sex.
The pervasive sexism and violence of our culture create a social climate-in the home, workplace, and street-that is different for women than for men. But even accurate generalizations
about women's need for help do not justify sex-based classifications such as those in this ordinance. It is also true that women
generally are still the ones who nurture young children. Yet we
understand that laws giving mothers an irrebuttable "tender
years" presumption for custody, or offering child rearing leaves
32
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only to mothers but not to fathers, ultimately hurt women and
are unconstitutional. 29
Some of the proponents of the ordinance believe that it will
empower women, while others support it for more traditional,
patriarchal reasons. Supra note 22. But many gender-based classifications are premised· on a good faith intent to help or protect
women. Good intent does not justify an otherwise invidious gender-based law. "Our nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination." Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. at
684. The clearest lesson of that history is that sex-based classifications hurt women.
Thus, the District Court was correct to reject Appellants'
claim that women are like children who need special protection
from sexually explicit material. The Court found that:
adult women as a group do not, as a matter of public policy or applicable law, stand in need of the same type of
protection which has long been afforded children. . . .
Adult women generally have the capacity to protect
themselves from participating in and being personally
victimized by pornography . . . .
American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. at 1333-34.
The gender-based classification embodied in the ordinance is
unconstitutional because it assumes and perpetuates classic sexist concepts of separate gender-defined roles, which carry "the
inherent risk of reinforcing the stereotypes about the 'proper
place' of women and their need for special protection." Orr v.
Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979).

29. On the dangers and unconstitutionality of a blanket "tender years" presumption,
see Devine v. Devine, 398 So. 2d 686 (Ala. 1981); Developments in the Law: The Constitution and the Family, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1156, 1334-38 (1980); S. Ross & A. Barcher, The
Rights of Women 229-30 (1983). On the danger and illegality of a mother-only child
rearing leave, see Danielson v. Board of Higher Educ., 358 F. Supp. 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
See also Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (company policy prohibiting the hiring of mothers, but not fathers, of preschool-aged children violates section
703(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). Williams, Reflections on Culture,
Courts and Feminism, 7 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 175, 198 (1982).
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D. The Sex-Based Classification and Stereotypes Created by
the Ordinance Are Not Carefully Tailored to Serve Important State Purposes.
Appellants claim that the ordinance serves the "governmental
interest in promoting sex equality." Appellants' brief at 23. Certainly preventing the violent subordination of women is the sort
of compelling public purpose that might justify sex-based classification. But, as is often true of classifications justified on
grounds that they protect women, the benefits actually provided
are minimal. The ordinance thus also fails the requirement for a
"substantial relationship" between its classification and the
achievement of its asserted goal. Mississippi Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724.
Supporters of the ordinance describe acts of violence against
women and claim that the ordinance would provide a remedy for
those injuries. But the only new remedy it provides is suppression of sexually explicit materials, a wholly inadequate and misdirected ·response to real violence.
Amicus Marchiano, for example, has written of her marriage
to a man who beat her, raped her, forced her into prostitution,
and terrorized her. L. Lovelace, Ordeal (1980). For several years
prior to the making of Deep Throat, she was virtually imprisoned by her husband through brute force, control of economic
resources, and the fact that she believed his claim that a wife
could not charge her husband with a crime. Id. at 82. Had this
ordinance existed then, it would not have helped her. There is a
compelling social need to provide more effective remedies for
victims of violence and sexual coercion. But the ordinance does
not protect vulnerable people against those actions already prohibited by the criminal law. Those who have worked to empower
battered women and children understand that effective enforcement of existing criminal sanctions demands a multipronged effort. Police and prosecutors must be trained, required to take
complaints seriously, and given the resources to do so. Bruno v.
McGuire, 4 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 3095 (1978). Help must be
available on a continuous and prompt basis. A. Boylan & N.
Taub, Adult Domestic Violence: Constitutional, Legislative and
Equitable Issues (1981). Vulnerable people must be educated
and provided support by community groups and shelters. L.
Bowker, Beating Wife Beating (1982). See generally S.
34

134

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 21:1 & 2

Schechter, Women and Male Violence: The Visions and Struggles of the Battered Women's Movement (1982); Marcus, Conjugal Violence: The Law of Force and the Force of Law, 69 Calif.
L. Rev. 1657 (1981). The remedy this ordinance provides for violence and sexual coercion is illusory.
Individuals who commit acts of violence must be held legally
and morally accountable. The law should not displace responsibility onto imagery. Amicus Women Against Pornography describe as victims of pornography married women coerced to perform sexual acts depicted in pornographic works, working
women harassed on the job with pornographic images, and children who have pornography forced on them during acts of child
abuse. Appellants' brief at 13. Each of these examples describes
victims of violence and coercion, not of images. The acts are
wrong, whether or not the perpetrator refers to an image. The
most wholesome sex education materials, if shown to a young
child as an example of what people do with those they love,
could be used in a viciously harmful way. The law should punish
the abuser, not the image. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act provides remedies for working women injured by sexual taunts or
slurs, including sexually explicit pictures, ~. Barnes v. Costle,
561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977), and for those injured by misogynist imagery. See, e.g., Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 461 F. Supp.
892 (D.N.J. 1978). These legal principles apply to any images or
texts which people put to discriminatory use, whether pornography or the Bible. But no law has or should assume that the same
woman harassed by pornographic images in the work place
might not enjoy those very images if given the opportunity to
put them to her own use.
To resist forced sex and violence, women need the material
resources to enable them to reject jobs or marriages in which
they are abused or assaulted and the internal and collective
strength to fight the conditions of abuse. The ordinance does
nothing to enhance the concrete economic and social power of
women. Further, its stereotype of women as powerless victims
undermines women's ability to act affirmatively to protect
themselves.
Suppression of sexually explicit material will not eliminate the
pervasive sexist images of the mainstream culture or the discriminatory economic and social treatment that maintains
women's second class status. Such suppression will not empower
women to enter into sexual relationships on a voluntary, consen35
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sual basis. Empowering women requires something more than
suppression of texts and images. It demands "concrete material
changes that enable women and men to experience sexuality less
attached to and formed by gender."30 These changes include social and economic equality; access to jobs, day care and education; more equal sharing of responsibility for children; recognition of the social and economic value of the work that women
have traditionally done in the home; and access to birth control,
abortion, and sex education.
Ill

CONCLUSION

Sexually explicit speech is not per se sexist or harmful to
women. Like any mode of expression, it can be used to attack
women's struggle for equal rights, but it is also a category of
speech from which women have been excluded. The suppression
authorized by the Indianapolis ordinance of a potentially enormous range of sexual imagery and texts reinforces the notion
that women are too fragile, and men too uncontrollable, absent
the aid of the censor, to be trusted to reject or enjoy sexually
explicit speech for themselves. By identifying "subordination of
women" as the concept that distinguishes sexually explicit material which is tolerable from that to be condemned, the ordinance
incorporates a vague and asymmetric standard for censorship
that can as readily be used to curtail feminist speech about sexuality, or to target the speech of sexual minorities, as to halt
hateful speech about women. Worse, perpetuation of the concept
of gender-determined roles in regard to sexuality strengthens
one of the main obstacles to achieving real change and ending
sexual violence.

30. Vance & Snitow, Toward a Conversation About Sex in Feminism: A Modest Proposal, 10 Signs: J. of Women in Culture and Soc. 126, 131 (1984).
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Amici therefore ask this Court to affirm the judgment below.
April 8, 1985
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